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PREFACE
In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, a younger, fresh-eyed version of myself was
at a crossroads. I have always had a deep fascination with the history of Southeast Asia and had
always thought I’d conduct research on that area. Meanwhile, my first years in college had been
spent in European history classes with a focus almost entirely in Russian cultural studies and
history. So when I, a doe-eyed historian in training, was required to pick a topic to study for my
methodology course I had the choice—delve into the history of Singapore’s founding, or
continue down the path of Soviet history, with a keen interest in Soviet-US relations. At the
time, I could not have foreseen the relevance in picking the latter, yet, here we are.
Studying the lives of George F. Kennan and W. Averell Harriman, as well as things like
Voice of America, World War II, soft power, and public diplomacy have broadened my
understanding of not only the world during the Cold War, but also the world we live in today.
Conducting primary research by poring over telegraphs, diaries, and interdepartmental notes
has given me interesting insight into how America has viewed itself over time, and how it views
those in foreign countries beyond the governments that represent them, especially the USSR.
Even beyond their explanations and references in my thesis, the research has truly shaped my
view of the practices of the United States in the realm of diplomacy and international affairs.
While it may not be the spotlight of my paper, it is one of the many themes I hope to convey
through my research and writing—along with the impact these topics and events have on the
history of diplomacy and propaganda, and how their humble beginnings still affect and
influence us.

3

INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s, political scientist and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph
Nye coined the term soft power. As defined by him, soft power in a political and cultural context
is “The ability to affect others and obtain preferred outcomes by attraction and persuasion
rather than coercion or payment.” It is important to note that while Nye developed the concept
in an American context, it can be used in international and interpersonal contexts.1 Nye believes
that there has been a growing trend toward an interest in soft power, and sees America at the
forefront of its evolution and development. While the term may have been coined in the 1980s
by Nye, the concept existed well before him, and had effectively been put into practice decades
before it received an official name.2
A primary example of the United States' aptitude for soft power lies in the early years of
the Cold War, in particular the mid to late 1940s. The use of soft power was vital to the vision
and mission of the US Embassy in Moscow. In turn, the State Department used soft power to
shape the view of America abroad and forced the struggle of American ideals to be shared in a
fair light in communist states. The efforts of ambassadors such as W. Averell Harriman and
George F. Kennan in the creation of State Department programs such as the magazine Amerika
and Voice of America, as well as other forms of polite propaganda, act as a litmus test for the
development of American soft power in a diplomatic context. Through examination of State
Department records and interdepartmental notes of the mid to late 1940s, as well as primary
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and secondary resources concerning early US backed Cold War programs in the Soviet Union, I
will make clear not only the use of soft power in late 1940s US-Soviet relations, but also the
impact it had on the direction of the Cold War and future endeavors regarding public diplomacy
campaigns.
To begin, an explanation of terms and concepts, as well as a summary of the research on
these subjects will be given. Doing so will hopefully convey the history of research and analysis
already given to these subjects and better frame the direction of the thesis conducted in this
paper. Next, context for the historical time period will be given to better understand the setting
which would have necessitated these soft power programs. It will be followed by background on
some of the major diplomats at the US Embassy in Moscow, along with their outlooks on the
early years of the Cold War to further examine the reasoning behind such policies. Following
that will be analysis of these programs, their development, and their impact on the State
Department’s mission and goals in the Soviet Union throughout the end of the 1940s and soft
powers changes into the 1950s. Finally, a conclusion will summarize the impact of the soft
power in the early years of the Cold War and its effectiveness for the remainder of the century.

5

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT
Research on the topic of American propaganda efforts in the USSR in the late 1940s and
early fifties seems to fixate on its purpose and why such measures were required. Even as early
as the 1950s, political scientists and cultural theorists began their dissection of American media
efforts. In 1950, New Yorker contributor Creighton Peet published a review in the College Art
Journal on such subjects. Peet posits that in the beginning of the Cold War, programs like the
magazine Amerika were effective due to their ability to engage with the common class of Soviet
citizens. Amerika was a magazine published by the US State Department and distributed within
the USSR as the first in a series of US State sponsored propaganda. Its contents ranged from
how the United States judicial system worked to pieces on American culture, such as industrial
factories and technological advances in Aerospace. 3 Amerika was seemingly created to give the
US perspective of how capitalism had flourished, rather than its inherent evil as depicted by
Soviet State sponsored media. Peet argues that the direct response the Soviet government had
to the publication points to its initial success. At the same time Amerika had begun publication
in the USSR, the increase in Anti-American rhetoric by the Soviet State owned paper
Pravda—named after the Russian word for truth—gave the US State Department an indication
that their efforts in soft power had not gone unnoticed. Peet also explains that this is one of the
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reasons the State Department upped the number of magazines they published in the Soviet
Union. 4
Political scientist and professor Anita Mallinckrodt Dasbach also wrote extensively about
American propaganda behind the Iron Curtain, also looking at it through the lens of cultural and
diplomatic influence. In her writing, Dasbach focuses on the themes and topics covered in the
magazine Amerika as a case study of the message the US was hoping to send to those in the
USSR, such as the use of arts and culture sections to show American innovation and
contributions to wider culture. Her research, however, is primarily focused on later editions of
the publication as late as the 1960s, and is centered mostly on their influence at the time,
rather than as a retrospection. 5
Looking at the topic of US propaganda in the USSR and its impact with a historical lens
has only become a more prominent conversation in the last two decades. Historian, professor,
and journalist Andrew L. Yarrow takes a similar approach to Dasbach and Peet with one key
advantage—the ability to view the past and its impact on the Cold War. For his research, Yarrow
not only focuses on the extent of US foreign propaganda, or as he and others have called it
public diplomacy, but also the long term impacts these early efforts in the 1940s and 1950s had
on US policy changes and public perception in the Soviet Union. It is in this school of thought
and study that a proper understanding of the historical impact of US soft power in the USSR can
take place. 6
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THE EARLY 1900s
Before the Second World War, ,the relationship between the Soviet Union and the
United States of America could be described as strained at best. In 1917, the Russian Empire
collapsed, and from its ashes arose a new communist state. This cultural and political
revolution, achieved through violent rebellion led by Vladimir Lenin, had successfully created a
republic of the working class, for the working class.7 However, this momentous event in the
USSR did not earn the reborn state many friends in the West, including the United States. The
national sentiment in America at the time was one of apprehension and fear towards
communism. The Red Scare, a general fear of communism expanding outside the Soviet sphere,
was on the rise and taking hold of America. However, the US at the time was not interested in
getting involved militarily. The events of the recently won First World War in many ways
dissuaded President Woodrow Wilson and the government at large from pursuing military
action.8 From the late 1910s until the 1930s, things would remain in limbo for the USSR and US,
and the two countries would resume official diplomatic relations in the early 1930s.
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WWII: Tenuous Allies
It would be impossible to discuss early American Cold War diplomacy without an
understanding of the US and Soviet Union’s interactions and allyship during World War II.
Hopefully in providing context to the time, we can get a better framework of the United States
view of the USSR leading up to the Cold War, and in turn understand how public diplomacy
became a practical tool in achieving their goals.
By the start of the 1940s, the USSR and the US had both become involved in WWII.
Through Nazi expansion in Eastern Europe, and Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, both countries
had been brought in by direct conflict. Their involvement in the war eventually led to the
formation of the Allied powers—a united front of states working to combat Axis expansion.
However, even within the Allied powers there existed a certain level of distrust. This was
highlighted by anxiety surrounding the world’s fate should the Allies win, especially for the
Soviet Union. As an ideologically and culturally communist state, the Soviet Union not only
looked to win its war with the German Reich, but also to insure its own prosperous future. This
desire led to a number of tactical decisions by both the US and USSR, with the most notable of
these taking place during the Tehran and Yalta conferences.
During the course of WWII, the Allied powers held a number of strategic meetings,
known as conferences, in various locations. These meetings acted as a way for the Allied powers
to develop inter-military cooperation and plan inter-military missions. One of the most famous
of these meetings was the Tehran Conference. It was notable for a number of reasons, the first

9

being that it served as the in person introduction for Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin. Until
the Tehran Conference, neither leaders had met in person, in fact this marked the first meeting
of the “Big Three” of the Allied powers.9
The majority of the conference took place at the Soviet Embassy, with the emphasis of
the meeting focused on the need for a secondary front and cross-channel invasion of Nazi
territory to fight German forces back. Each leader of the “Big Three''—the United States, The
USSR, and Great Britain—however, had come to the conference with different goals in mind.
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill, had come with the hopes of
putting off a cross-channel offensive in hopes to bring attention to what he believed as an
underserved operation against Italian forces in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, both Roosevelt
and Stalin supported the advancement of “Operation Overlord”—more commonly known as the
Battle of Normandy or ‘D-Day’. Eventually Churchill agreed to discuss the basic terms of the
operation, negotiating to give it top priority in the following year. 10
At first glance, the agreement between the Soviet Union and the US on “Operation
Overlord” can be viewed as a step forward in Soviet-US relations, but it can also be viewed in a
less favorable light. At the time of the conference, a level of skepticism was certainly an element
of the Allies’ alliance. One of the greater fears of these uneasy relations was that of the war
ending in a “separate peace”—meaning an end to the war by one nation signing an individual
agreement with the enemy and the rest of the allies to continue to fight. Both the USSR and the
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US feared that should they not agree on an Allied offensive, they could very well be left holding
the line in a separate peace scenario.11
This fear can be further supported by viewing the events and effects of the Second “Big
Three” strategic meeting, the Yalta Conference. By February of 1945, the tide had turned and
the Allies had victory in sight. The Soviet Union’s influence on Eastern Europe along with the
decline of British influence contributed to how the Allies discussed the future of the continent,
and by extension the world, in a post-war era. The conference ended in an agreement known as
the “Declaration on Liberated Europe.” Sponsored and authored by the Americans, the hope in
adopting it was to ensure that there would be no separate peace and that, once the dust had
settled, the Allied powers would have near equal spheres of influence in the reshaping of
Europe. As explained by World War I & II Historian Michael J. Lyons, the declaration sought to
create an equal playing field in the newly liberated countries with coalition governments of
communists and non-communists setting up democratic parliamentary elections. These actions,
as Lyons argues, were “ [a] rather forlorn attempt to moderate Soviet intentions in Eastern
Europe.”12
The events of the Tehran and Yalta conferences presented a theme in the WWII Allyship
between the US and USSR, a clear and pervasive distrust, with the knowledge that should the
war end with an Allied victory, America and the Soviet Union would be in a position to shape
the future of the world. This theme would only be exacerbated by the invention of nuclear
weapons of mass destruction, as well as other advancements in technology in the years
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proceeding. For the purposes of the research presented in this essay, the important takeaway is
the power which these states wielded and the US’ views on Soviet expansion and its influential
reach.

GROWING PROPAGANDA: Contextualizing American soft power
Before exploring the advances and developments made during the Cold War in the
realm of soft power, it is important to understand US history with public diplomacy. American
public diplomacy officially became adopted and utilized in the early 1900s. As mentioned
before, the desire to soften the United States’ image abroad had been around long before the
Cold War. The difference being that, up until the 1910s, these efforts were almost entirely
privatized. Examples of private companies engaging in soft power on behalf of the United States
include cultural shows, like Buffalo Bill Cody’s Wild West show touring Europe, and private
scholarships from American businesses for international students to study in the US. 13
The first substantial example of the US getting involved with public diplomacy was with
the Committee on Public Information (CPI). President Woodrow Wilson started the committee,
as historian Nicholas J. Cull describes it, “ to sell the [first world] War to the American public.”14
While it was created as a tool for propaganda in the US, it eventually became the office that
oversaw the exportation of both in-house propaganda films and distribution of Hollywood films
overseas that they deemed beneficial to their mission.15
If Wilson set the groundwork, Franklin Roosevelt began the construction and marketing.
A man ever interested in public opinion, Roosevelt invested in a number of programs
13
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throughout his presidency dedicated to international press and informational releases. These
included the United States Information Service, The Office of Government Reports, and the
Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. While this exercise of soft power was useful
during WWII, a full heel turn to public diplomacy did not occur until the beginning of the Cold
War.

16

***
As already mentioned, at the dawn of the Cold War, the former Axis powers came under
the auspices of both the United States and the USSR. This consisted of some being under the
direct influence of both, and others only answering to one of the two remaining superpowers.
With the US remaining in these former enemy nations, the opportunity for them to shape their
image became one of importance. It is here that the United States began to see the usefulness
of its already existing infrastructure for propaganda and influence via soft power. 17
In these parts of the world, the American government looked to various forms of both
direct and indirect exercises in culture building. An example of a more direct change includes
the work done by General MacArthur to dismantle the Japanese military and set up a new form
of democratic government.18 However, the more interesting was the first steps taken in creating
a robust relaunch of the American brand in these nations, and implementing it via media,
reeducation, and policy enactments.
A key aspect of this was print media, including various newspapers being printed in
these nations. These papers laid out a way to connect with the general population and began to
16
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redefine what culture looked like in these states, seemingly to push them towards accepting an
American vision for their futures. While re-education programs were also a large part of
America’s early soft power efforts during the time, the works of these papers became a valuable
asset, as they spoke to an audience outside of adolescence. According to historian of American
public diplomacy Nicholas Cull, the German versions of these papers were influenced by both
US war veterans and returned refugees, who worked together on the staff. Radio and film also
played a large part in US public diplomacy in Austria, Germany, and Japan. With the
experimentation of soft power showing signs of success in these newly US controlled nations, it
was clear that soft power could play an equally, if not more important role in nations the US
saw as potential enemies. 19

19

Cull, p. 27
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A COLD FRONT COMES: The spark of the Cold War
Once WWII had ended, a different conflict was starting to form. The desolation of
Europe, both physically and economically, had left the United States and the Soviet Union as the
only true superpowers in the wake of the war. This in turn would lead to further tension due to
a number of factors. The first of prominence is the inherent difference in ideology. With the
Soviet Union looking to expand the reach of communism by taking half of Europe under its
control, the United States and other non-commuist allies looked to influence the region as much
as possible. Such efforts would lead directly to the formation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947.20,
The Truman Doctrine, though not publicly adopted until late 1947 (nearly a year after
Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech, in which he spoke of a similar effort to be made), is generally
defined as the official stance of the US government’s efforts to contain communism. Its origins
can be found in President Truman’s push for an increase in funding for military and economic
aid to Turkey and Greece in the hopes it would help combat the expansion of communism. In
his address to Congress concerning his plan, Truman said “It must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or
by outside pressures.” 21 As argued by Dennis Merrill, a historian of US diplomacy, the Truman
doctrine was the first of US international initiatives to be on a truly global scale. It served as the

20
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basis for a number of other political and military actions throughout the rest of the century,
such as the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Korean and Vietnam Wars
in later decades. 22
Among these efforts was also the Marshall Plan, an important economic plan developed
for the parts of Europe under US support and protection following WWII. The importance of the
Marshall Plan cannot be understated. In a working 1991 report for the National Bureau of
Economic Research, economists Bary Eichengren and J. Bradford De Long argued, based on their
findings, that the impact of the Marshall plan was well beyond immediate economic gains, but
rather helped in transforming how “mixed economies” work in Europe due to the conditions in
which the monetary allocations from the US had to be used.23
While these policies and directives were implemented after the years in which the
research presented here is concerned, it is helpful in understanding where the US would soon
find itself in a quickly globalizing world, and how on a larger level the US government would
view and combat the Soviet Union’s expansionist actions.
As the bedrock has been laid for the United States views on the Soviet Union at large,
the issue now shifts to how the US decided to represent themselves in the communist state. To
do so, an examination of the WWII era ambassador to the Soviet Union W. Averell Harriman and
long term Soviet specialist diplomat and future ambassador to the USSR, George F. Kennan, will
be used to show insight into the operations of the Embassy and actions of Americans in the
twilight of WWII and the dawn of the Cold War in The USSR.

22
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W. Averell Harriman was born into a wealthy New York Family in 1891. A graduate of
Yale, Averell Harriman had become an accomplished banker and investor by the 1920s.24 In the
1930s, however, Harriman turned his interest to public service. After suffering some financial
and personal losses due to the stock market crash leading to the Great Depression, Averell
began to wade into the world of politics by taking a number of meetings with President of the
United States Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The nature of these meetings was to discuss economic
matters, such as the railroad industry—on which Harriman was an expert. This in turn led to
Harriman becoming an advisor on the President's New Deal policies for Wall Street and banks. 25
While he gained the respect of his fellow advisors in Washington, his connection to the
administration would yield a very different effect on Wall Street, that being the admonishment
of his fellow bankers and Wall Street executives, even viewing him as a traitor and “unfaithful to
his kind”.26
His loyalty to the President paid off however, and the 1940s saw Harriman become a full
fledged diplomat. Starting off in the Office of Production Management, and eventually leading
to becoming a special liaison of the President in helping manage the Lend-Lease program, an
initiative designed to distribute material aid to the UK and USSR, Harriman quickly became a
central figure in the FDR administration. By the time the US had become involved in the war,
Harriman was being given increased responsibilities by the White House.
Eventually Harriman’s experience with the USSR via the Lend-Lease program, and his
proven trustworthiness to Roosvelt, led to his appointment as the ambassador to the Soviet

24

Abramson, Rudy. Spanning the Century: the Life of W. Averell Harriman, First Edition, p. 10, 94, 186-189
Abramson, p. 242
26
Abramson, p. 243
25

17

Union in 1943. At first reluctant to take the position, Harriman eventually acquiesced and took
the assignment to the “most important diplomatic post” of the time.27 Harriman’s reluctance
came from a fear that he would not be able to find enjoyment or meaning in the work he was
doing, or at least any more than he had already found in his position in London working on the
Lend-Lease program. Harriman thought the job in Moscow was near impossible and incredibly
difficult, no matter who tried to do it.
Near the end of his tenure as ambassador, Harriman had become keenly aware of what
Soviet views of the United States were, or at least the image of the US they wished to present to
their citizens. In his first documented correspondence with the State Department office in D.C.
in 1946, Harriman wrote of the importance of maintaining American Media and messaging
present in the USSR through funding and resources, as its availability to the Russian people was
important in the shaping of a more positive image of the US. His emphasis on this seems to be
rooted in his belief, and by extension a general thought in the wider department, that relations
between the USSR and the US was one of utmost importance, if not the most important
directive.28 It is also in this message to the State Department that Harriman lays out the direct
conflict the Embassy was seemingly in with the Soviet Government, almost a cold battle in this
forming cold war.
“While we have no doubt that [the] Soviet people earnestly desire to understand USA and
maintain good relations with USA, [the] policy of small group of men who rule USSR, as revealed
in Soviet Govt and Communist Party propaganda, suggests that this small group of men have
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consistently sought to present to [the] Soviet people a distorted and unfavorable picture of
USA.” 29
Harriman also asserted that given the history of the USSR, it would not be worth the
time, energy, and resources to try and reason with those at the top of the Soviet Government.
Instead, it was in Harriman’s opinion that projects aimed at the Soviet public would be a better
investment in changing opinions of The US. 30
***
While Harriman was certainly a central figure in Moscow in the years leading into the
Cold War, George F. Kennan was also a major player. Starting his diplomatic career before WWII,
Kennan had spent a large part of his public service career up until that point almost entirely in
the Soviet sphere of influence. A career Foreign Service Officer, Kennan first came into contact
with the Soviet Government in 1934. In the years prior to his appointment, Kennan had been
assigned to learn Russian history and the language while posted in Germany.31 Much of his time
was spent not only learning about the pre-revolution history of the Russian empire, but also
studying communist ideology in an effort to form his own opinion on the goals of the Soviet
Government.32 However, seeing as the United States did not officially recognize the Soviet Union
after the Revolution, formal relations had not taken place and Kennan moved around various
locations in Eastern Europe. A chance encounter with the first ambassador to the Soviet Union
landed him a position as a Soviet specialist. In 1934, Kennan finally made it to Moscow as a
member of the first American diplomatic delegation to the newly recognized Soviet Union.
29
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Kennan would go on to serve as a Foreign Service Officer in Moscow for the first time
from 1934-1937, but the first year in The USSR proved difficult for him. His fascination with the
Soviet Union and his idealism led to disappointment and frustration with the mundane nature
of the work he was focused on. All of this combined with having to exercise “...self restraint and
objectivity” as a Foreign Service Officer led to a nervous breakdown in December of the same
year. This led to nearly a year of leave from the State Department to rest and recuperate in
Vienna.33 In November of 1935, Kennan returned to his post in Moscow. His following years
spent in the USSR would help to build his credibility as an expert on Soviet affairs, but would
also inform his opinions of the Soviet Union. During the year of Kennan’s absence, the cultural
attitude toward disentants and foreign nations in the Soviet Union had changed. Upon returning
to the USSR, Kennan noted that Soviets who had been hobnobbing with foreigners had in some
instances been detained, exiled, or executed—all part of Stalin’s larger purges taking place at
the time. For foreigners and US officials this meant, as described by Kennan, a period of
extreme isolation and ostracization, leaving the young diplomat longing for a transfer from the
state he had so long wanted to work in. 34
However, Kennan eventually found his way back to the Soviet Union as the Charge de
Affairs for the Moscow Embassy under Ambassador W. Averell Harriman. His first year back in
Moscow was certainly an eventful one, so much so that he did not keep a personal record for
the year 1946, as he had for the majority of his life.35 However, 1946 was indeed a major year
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for Kennan’s writing, with perhaps his most famous contribution, “The Long Telegram” being
penned that year.
Kennan’s years of studying Russian history and communism, as well as his time spent as
a US official in Moscow, made him one of the most qualified individuals to speak on the inner
workings of the Soviet Union. In early 1946, the already strained relationship with the US had
become even more tenuous.36 It was at this time that Kennan penned his famous telegram.
Kennan’s long telegram is generally considered to be a major document that helped shape US
foreign policy in the USSR for many years after it was penned. In it, Kennan detailed his
thoughts on the USSR's own foreign policy and speculated about its potential future as a sphere
of influence. The telegram began to take shape initially as a response to what Kennan had seen
as the overarching theme of Soviet attitudes toward capitalist society—that conflict between
the two ideologically different worlds would be constant and inevitable. However, it appears
that the defining moment that led Kennan to pen the document was to respond to a speech
given by Joseph Stalin in early February of 1946. According to historian John Lewis Gaddis,
Stalin's speech seemed to imply that while communists were inclined to peace, they would be
prepared to retaliate if the capitalist world began conflict, something the Supreme Soviet noted
capitalists were inclined to do.37
While the speech was “routine” to Kennan, its effect on President Truman was much
greater. Along with reports of Soviet spies looking to steal American nuclear secrets, Kennan
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was encouraged by both the State Department and Harriman, who had by that time left his
ambassadorship, to express his thoughts on Soviet ideology. 38
Kennan’s telegram featured his outlook on the Soviet position in the post-war world and
how it would seek to accomplish its goals. Writing on the Soviet position post-war first, Kennan
noted that the official stance of the USSR was that it could not exist in “permanent peace” while
surrounded by capitalist nations. Also in his assessment, Kennan observed the Soviet outlook as
breaking the world into two factions; communist and capitalist. In the Soviet point of view, the
capitalist world would always be inherently fraught with internal and external conflicts. In doing
so, Kennan brought to light the other common enemy of the USSR; moderate socialists, known
as “false friends” by Leninists.39 To this end, Kennan asserted that the USSR was set on
advancing their strength in “international society” and looked to reduce the presence of
capitalism throughout the world by directing their efforts to causing conflict between capitalist
powers. By directly causing conflict within the “capitalist encirclement” and combating so called
false friends, the USSR hoped it would achieve its goal in spreading communism globally. 40
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THINGS HEAT UP: A push against censorship and Soviet propaganda
While the US was beginning to realize the Cold War it was getting involved in was one of
cultural, scientific, and ideological battles, the US Embassy in Moscow was coming to
understand its war was one of public image and censorship. After official diplomatic ties were
reinstated between the USSR and the United States in the 1930s, only a decade later officials
realized that a cultural shift in attitudes towards the US and the capitalist world in general had
taken place. As noted by then Charge de Affairs George F. Kennan, an increase of hostility
toward the capitalist world, and even socialists and leftists who had a working relationship with
them, had taken root as a mainstay of the USSR’s propaganda and had become a major part of
the official party line. As detailed in Kennan’s famous “Long Telegram”, while the communist
party’s official stance was in opposition to capitalism and painted capitalist states as adversaries
and devils, the people as a whole had a much more favorable view. 41
In Kennan’s assessment, both in his telegram and other State Department
correspondence, the general public of the USSR was at least somewhat interested in what the
western world was like. It was in Kennan’s view that only the government and party officials
were those looking to push a negative view of America, stating
“[The Russian people], by and large, [are] friendly to [the] outside world, eager for experience
of it, eager to measure against it[s] talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to
live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor. Party line only represents [the] thesis which
41
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[the] official propaganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often
remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But [the] party line is binding
for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power—party, secret police and
Government—and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.” 42

This hostility did not stop at the USSR’s borders, and extended into curtailing efforts of
American journalists sending stories back to the States. While publications like Pravda looked to
sell a bleak image of the United States and others in its own sphere, censorship laws and
policies had also come into place to slow down American journalists' work from getting back to
the US, and in some cases stopping it entirely. 43
By 1946, censorship of outgoing media had been taken over by the Soviet office that
dealt with internal censorship in the country, the Soviet Chief Administration of Literary and
Publishing Affairs, also known as Glavlit. The work, previously done by a different agency
dedicated to external media censorship, was seen as harsh even in the early stages of
changeover.44 George Kennan describes the issues of the changeover in a correspondence to the
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. At the time, Kennan had received news from a number of US
correspondents in Moscow that a number of stories they had written were subject to extensive
censorship and alteration, and in some occasions did not make it all the way to the US. On
March 6th 1946, Kennan wrote “I am worried about [the situation] of American correspondents
here… A check now made by [an] AP correspondent with his central office indicates that on
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March 5 out of 24 telegrams delivered to [the] Soviet Post Office for submission to [the]
Censorship Bureau, only 10 reached their destination. He has no way of ascertaining in what
shape these were finally [dispatched].” 45
George F. Kennan seemingly had a firm grasp on the Soviet Government’s approach to
media. It was Kennan’s opinion that the Soviet Government was interested in presenting their
own views on the United States as objective truth, and were also interested in shaping how
their messages were being portrayed. In mid 1946, former Prime Minister of Great Britain
Winston Churchill delivered his “Iron Curtain” speech in the United States on the need for
Anglo-American relations in defending against the growth of communism. In it, Churchill
emphasized the possibility of military intervention and how Western democracies would need
the US. 46
The speech was not popular among other world leaders in the West, however. Only a
few days later, President Truman looked to distance himself from giving direct support or
condemnation on the Prime Minister’s words. When asked by a member of the press what his
opinion on the speech was he simply replied “I have no comment.” 47
To connect this to the Soviet Government's media practices, Kennan gives insight into
how this episode in global politics was portrayed in The USSR. Pravda’s coverage of the speech
came out more detailed than expected considering the weight of Churchill’s words. Kennan
asserts this is no accident, saying that its careful publication date and time was tied to seeing
what the rest of the world’s views on it were, writing
45
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“This method of procedure was chosen after [the] Kremlin had carefully waited to see
reaction to Churchill’s speech in US and England and indicates Moscow considers echo to
Churchill’s statements to have been so weak that it is worthwhile to throw [Soviet] influence
into scales of international public reaction. Had Churchill’s speech found greater support in
English and American public opinion and [Government] circles, Moscow would doubtless have
taken a much more serious view of it and drawn other conclusions as to treatment.” 48
***
As negative as the reaction and attitudes of the Soviet Government might have been at
the time, the pushback stands in contrast to the attitudes of the general public. Even in the
early days of publishing Amerika, it was the Embassy’s position that its readership and impact
had grown beyond its initial circulation of 10,000 copies per month.49 With the magazine
consistently selling out, by February of 1946, Kennan had requested that the number of copies
sent each month be increased to 50,000.
The magazine, described at the time as “handsome [and] slick” was unique in its
contents.50 The magazine itself was considered a tool of presenting the American way of life.
Created to combat Pravda’s illustration of the US, it featured articles, photos, and information
on “[the] Average American School” and “[the]American Kitchen,” and even depictions of the
US judicial system. Amerika looked to showcase the standard of living Americans enjoyed,
without directly criticizing the Soviet standard of living. 51 The magazine was also noted for its
48
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emphasis on pictures. This can be explained for a couple of reasons, the first one being that
when the magazine was first published and put through the censorship process as foreign
media, pictures were not subject to the same stringent guidelines that written word articles
were. Secondly, through back channels and Soviet contacts, the Embassy had learned that
illustrations and pictures were an effective way of refuting Soviet propaganda, even quoting one
such contact in a telegram as having said “One good picture tells more about [the] USA than
thousands of words.” 52
While Amerika was the first of these projects to explore public diplomacy directed at the
public of the USSR, it did have its limitations. Since it chose to not directly challenge Soviet
policies, it could not give an American response on issues facing the globe or Soviet citizens.
With this limitation came the fact that the magazine had to remain primarily a cultural
exploration of America that hoped to dispel myths about America. Another obstacle was Soviet
censorship of both internal and external American media publication, as previously discussed.
While the censorship cracked down heavily on outgoing media about the USSR, media coming
in was also subject to harsh scrutiny. In turn, this led to the magazine having to be filled with
evergreen content—articles and content that had a timeless quality—since journalists and
contributors would have no idea how long it would take for the magazine to finally hit
circulation, or in what form. 53
Other options for more polite propaganda had been proposed as early as Harriman’s
tenure as Ambassador. One such idea was that of American radio programs and broadcasts. The
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Embassy’s initial interest in radio broadcasting was founded in the interest of creating an
informational channel to communicate American ideals in a more free way. It was in the opinion
of the Embassy that American broadcasts would be at an advantage over traditional means of
informational media, such as Russian language pamphlets, leaflets, and papers. By investing in
radio, Harriman hoped that there would be less interference upon the message that would be
sent out.
Even so, Harriman warned those who would develop the project of the tense
relationship the US and USSR shared, and gave advice on best practices as to not provoke
further issues, even as his Ambassadorship was coming to an end. Primarily, the out going
Ambassador emphasized the need to not criticize “[The] Soviet system, Government or
personalities,” warning that doing so could “on nationalistic and patriotic grounds, arouse
resentment of Soviet listeners and would prejudice our relations with the Soviet Government,”
something echoed by Kennan in his “Long Telegram.”
It seems that the Embassy, no matter the media in which they looked to extend their
public diplomacy, was chiefly concerned with changing the narrative of America in the USSR
from one of fear and villainy to one that would better suit their world image. Eventually,
Harriman's vision of radio programs to advance America’s agenda abroad would be fully realized
in 1947 with the introduction of Voice of America to the Soviet world.
Originally created as a shortwave radio broadcast for an earlier propaganda effort during
WWII, Voice of America became much more well known for its impact on public diplomacy
during the Cold War. Originally, content for Voice of America was outsourced to NBC and CBS
radio to create the programs featuring American News and cultural programming via a contract
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with the Government. It is important to note that Voice of America was not exclusively
broadcast in the Soviet Union. Rather, Voice of America, as lawyer and writer Ralph A. Uttaro
argues, became the official mouthpiece for the United States abroad.54 However, this is not to
say the American diplomatic efforts in the USSR did not directly influence the longevity and
programming of Voice of America. While it is true that the radio broadcast stretched the entire
globe, the reason it was able to do so was at the behest of the American government's
commitment to combating the spread of communism. It seems that in some ways, Harriman
and other diplomats' position on the need for the American government to have a more
immediate vocal presence behind the Iron Curtain helped lead to legislation that made Voice of
America possible.
By the late 1940s, Voice of America was under the full control of the State Department
and had become a successful endeavor for the United States’ efforts in soft power and
propaganda overseas, even leading to privatized sister programs. Broadcasts such as Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty were started as private broadcasts in an attempt to further a better
image of America abroad. Interestingly enough, these other programs took a different approach
to how they informed those in Soviet Countries of American life. While Voice of America served
as the official voice of the US government on international affairs and focused on the policies of
the US and Soviet Governments and looked to explain American organizations and structure,
these other broadcasts looked to give a glimpse into the life of private American citizens, not
unlike the State Department’s own cultural project, Amerika. 55
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A SHIFT IN PRACTICE: Diplomacy gets a soft side
The Cold War brought about a time of massive change for the better majority of the
world, as well as impacted the future of how wars were fought and won. While WWII certainly
gave a glimpse into the influence that soft power could wield with the influence propaganda
had both internationally and domestically, its aftermath proved its necessity in the field of
diplomacy and international affairs surrounding countries in conflict. The use of media and
cultural influence to aid in the mission of American diplomats in the USSR was invaluable, and
proved the adoption of such policies on a primary basis could prove fruitful.
Having proved that informational campaigns and polite propaganda could work
internationally in former enemy nations like Germany and Japan, the advancements made both
in response to the USSR’s policies in later 1940s undeniably impacted the future of the Cold
War. It also aided in the evolution of diplomacy during the better half of the 20th century, and
some would say even into the present day. Large steps such as the Marshall Plan are indeed a
factor in the utilization of non-military means to influence other countries. However the ground
level programs created to help in redefining the United States in the eyes of the USSR, and
eventually others in the communist world, directly ties to the expansion of similar policies and
an eventual shift in politics to favoring soft power intervention.
An argument could be made for this shift being owed to the advancements in
technology and weapons of mass destruction. However, based on the research presented, it is
not the primary factor for this shift in the culture of international affairs. On the contrary,
factors outside of avoidance to military action seem to have had a more important emphasis, as
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a battle of ideology and containment was the goal of the United States and other ally countries.
Evidence of such a goal can be found in public addresses, such as Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech
and President Truman’s own thoughts on the matter when pitching the Marshall Plan for
congressional approval. It seemingly was also in the interest of USSR officials, as they began to
see how the propaganda game could pay off.
The decision to implement US government sponsored propaganda as a tool was in large
part taken as a defensive strategy to combat the USSR’s own version of public diplomacy. By
mid-1945, the USSR had begun making their own publications to showcase the success
communism had seen in the Soviet sphere, in an attempt to push a positive view of communism
to other countries. The then Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs William B. Benton, in
consultation with American academic Harold Lasswell, assessed that this would indeed be one
of the hardest things to overcome. The USSR was riding high on the good will of the world
following its efforts during WWII, and the US, at least according to Laswell, was facing scrutiny
of internal issues concerning racism, ultimately undermining the image of the US.56 This was
something echoed by Foreign Service Officers in Moscow, noting that Soviet publications often
harped on the fact the United States had a long history of racial intolerance, with Harriman
writing in a telegram to the Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, “To [the] exclusion of material
favorable to [the] USA, controlled Soviet press and radio feature strikes, unemployment and
other industrial strife, racial discrimination and crime.” 57
These actions would in turn lead to a further push for American public diplomacy.
However, the brand of US propaganda took on a significantly different role to that of the USSR’s
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efforts. For the Americans, the focus would be on incoming US state media aimed to target the
general public in the USSR. While the US certainly looked to influence the views and opinions of
nations outside of direct Soviet influence and control, programs like Voice of America and
Amerika looked to reprogram the minds of Soviet citizens from one of indoctrinated hatred to,
at least in their eyes, a more nuanced and “fair” opinion of the United States. In fact, the same
telegram Harriman sent noting that Soviet state media had cast a dark shadow on the US, he
also wrote of the importance and goal these efforts of public diplomacy would try to achieve,
saying “[The] Only practicable alternative at this stage is [a] vigorous and intelligent American
information program designed to bring somewhat into balance picture of [the] USA available to
Soviet public.” 58
This assessment of the power Soviet media held was later addressed by Kennan’s “Long
Telegram”, as well as by a report conducted by White House officials at the suggestion of
Truman.59 In his exhaustive report “American Relations With The Soviet Union,” Special Counsel
Clark Clifford agrees with Kennan’s assessment that from the Soviet perspective, peace between
the communist and capitalist worlds can never be. While the American position was to work
toward a world of peace, Clark states that “[Soviet] leaders with whom we hope to achieve an
understanding on the principles of international peace appear to believe that war with the
United States and other leading capitalistic nations is inevitable.” 60 He also states that a
challenge that exists is the growing military capabilities of the Soviet Union, and that the United
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States should be willing to show signs of power as it is the “only language which disciples of
power politics understand.” 61
However, while Clark was focused on the power of the US military, he was also aware of
the efforts to discredit the United States via propaganda, and warned US officials to “avoid any
actions which give an appearance of truth to the Soviet charges” of imperialism and other
perceived offensives.62 Clark also stated that time and resources should be given for the
purpose of creating a “determined effort” to dispel such propaganda, and suggested to push the
notion to “friendly nations” that capitalism is at the very least as valid of a system as
communism. 63
This direct objective would eventually deliver an outcome that at first glance would
seem unplanned, but seemingly was the next logical step the United States could have taken.
Efforts made by Benton and those serving in the foriegn service in the USSR made it clear that
an impact was being made via these public diplomacy efforts. In fact, it was Benton who fully
realized the Soviet division of Voice of America. Benton also played a large role in bringing other
types of American media to the USSR in 1949, such as Hollywood films and educational
exchange programs.64 However, both the newly appointed Secretary of State George C.
Marshall—the man for whom the Marshall Plan is named after—did not believe in using
propaganda as a tool for combating Soviet propaganda. This, coupled with internal issues and
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congressional debate about how effective these programs and plans were, led to budget cuts
taking place. 65
However, this was not the death of soft power and public diplomacy, but seemingly a
repositioning. Once the Truman doctrine had been created—which looked to aid countries
hoping to fight communism and contain the Soviet Union as much as possible—a different need
for soft power and informational warfare was arising.66 During this time, the budget was
severely cut for such programming. Despite this, some significant victories took place in the
area of expanding the reach of State sponsored media that would be seen, heard, and read
internationally, such as the Smith-Mundt Act which insured government funded infrastructure
for distribution of US government media.67

65

Cull, p. 35
Cull, p. 36
67
Cull, p. 40, 42
66

34

A BRIEF CONCLUSION
In the United States, the use of soft power has had a long history, with varying degrees
of importance. While the 1910s saw America’s first foray into the realm of public diplomacy and
exercised the use of soft power via government backed cultural exports, the importance of it
was not fully realized until its necessity in the Cold War, specifically for those in the USSR and by
extension others in the Soviet Bloc.
The push for such an emphasis on a global propaganda campaign and the development
of a robust American public diplomacy aparatis was nurtured, developed, and necessitated by
the nature of the Cold War. Advancements in weapons of mass destruction, military funding
increases, and the shadow of WWII certainly gave the world pause at the thought of another
global conflict and the hope to maintain peace was one that many seemingly looked to. The
efforts of which determined the beginning of the groundwork being laid for the evolution of
public diplomacy’s influence in The USSR. While perhaps not the initial focus of the US in the
early years of conflict, public diplomacy and cultural influence worked as a primary tool for
shaping the opinion of capitalism in the Soviet World.
The early battle of paper and broadcast in Moscow, rather than of guns and bombs,
would only scratch the surface of the game of soft power. Further programs in media and
education developed well beyond the 1940s and 50s with the establishment of the United
States Information agency in 1953. The USIA would continue as the US government’s official
office for creating, maintaining, and distributing media and literature dedicated to influencing
the international world by means of cultural, societal, and arts focused approach.68 While
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American cultural influence has played a major role in the last century, reaching its way across
the globe, the beginning of true American soft power had a humble start in conversations,
telegrams, magazines, and radio programs in Eastern Europe and the USSR itself.
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